In this paper, we present a machine learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction (CA). The main goal of integrating machine learning (ML) into the auction is to improve preference elicitation, which is a major challenge in large CAs. In contrast to prior work, our auction design uses value queries instead of prices to drive the auction. The ML algorithm is used to help the auction decide which value queries to ask in every iteration. While using ML inside an auction introduces new challenges, we demonstrate how we obtain a design that is individually rational, has good incentives, and is computationally practical. We benchmark our new auction against the well-known combinatorial clock auction (CCA). Our results indicate that, especially in large domains, our ML-powered auction can achieve higher allocative e ciency than the CCA, even with only a small number of value queries.
Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate multiple items among bidders who may view these items as complements or substitutes. Speci cally, they allow bidders to submit bids on bundles of items to express their complex preferences. CAs have found widespread real-world applications, including for the sale of spectrum licenses (Cramton, 2013) and the allocation of TV-ad slots (Goetzendorf et al., 2015) .
One of the main challenges when conducting CAs in practice is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items, which typically makes it impossible for bidders to report their full value function. Practical CA designs allow bidders to report only a limited number of bids which are treated as "all-ornothing" bundle bids by the auctioneer (see, e.g., Ausubel and Baranov, 2017) . However, this number can be very small compared to the total number of bundles. For example, the 2014 Canadian spectrum auction (Industry Canada, 2013) had 106 clock rounds (where each bidder essentially submits one bid per round), followed by a second phase in which bidders were limited to submit bids on at most 500 of the 2 98 possible bundles (and multiple bidders reached this limit of 500 bids). Thus, preference elicitation remains a primary problem, especially in large CAs.
Preference Elicitation in CAs
Researchers have addressed this preference elicitation challenge by designing bidding languages that are succinct yet expressive for speci c (restricted) classes of valuation functions (see Nisan (2006) for a survey). For some applications (e.g., in procurement auctions), practitioners have also developed domain-speci c bidding languages exploiting speci c knowledge about the structure of the bidders' value functions (Sandholm, 2013; Goetzendorf et al., 2015) . However, in many domains, like spectrum auctions, bidders' value functions exhibit such a rich and complex structure that they do not fall into any of the succinctly expressible valuation classes supported by the domain-speci c languages proposed in the literature. Furthermore, any particular choice of a domain-speci c bidding language may favor one bidder over another, which is problematic for a government-run auction which should not bias against certain participants. But, unfortunately, if one must support general valuations and guarantee full (or even approximate) e ciency, then the auction requires an exponential amount of communication in the worst case (Nisan and Segal, 2006) .
To get around this di culty in practice, the preference elicitation challenge is often addressed by using iterative combinatorial auctions, where the auctioneer heuristically elicits information from the bidders over multiple rounds, imposing some kind of limit on the amount of information exchange. Common formats include ascending-price auctions as well as clock auctions, where prices are used to coordinate the bidding process. In recent years, the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has gained momentum . Between 2012 and 2014 alone, ten countries have used the CCA, raising approximately $20 billion in revenues, with the 2014 Canadian 700 MHZ auction being the largest auction, raising more than $5 billion (Ausubel and Baranov, 2017) . The CCA consists of two main phases: in the initial clock phase, the auctioneer quotes (linear) item prices in each round, and bidders are asked to respond to a demand query, stating their pro tmaximizing bundle at the quoted prices. In the second phase (the supplementary round), bidders can submit a nite number of bundle bids (typically up to 500). This design is meant to combine good price discovery in the clock phase with good expressiveness in the supplementary round.
In spite of the practical success of the CCA, a recent line of papers has revealed some of its shortcomings. Regarding bidding complexity, Knapek and Wambach (2012) discuss why bidding optimally in the CCA may be challenging. Janssen, Karamychev and Kasberger (2017) and Janssen and Kasberger (2015) discuss how bidders can engage in strategic behavior if they want to increase rivals' costs or if they are facing budget constraints.
In addition to these issues with bidding complexity and incentives, another line of research has studied the e ciency of the CCA. Some experimental studies have shown that bidders may not be able to accurately respond to a demand query (which may require full exploration of the exponentially-sized value space). In particular, Sche el, Ziegler and Bichler (2012) and Bichler, Shabalin and Wolf (2013) have shown that bidders tend to focus on a limited search space consisting of some bundles of items selected prior to the auction, and that this can cause signi cant e ciency losses (between 4% to 11% in their experiments).
Overview of our Contributions
To address these shortcomings of the CCA, we propose a new auction design, speci cally a machine learningpowered iterative combinatorial auction. In contrast to the CCA, our auction does not use demand queries (i.e., prices) but instead asks bidders for value reports on individual bundles. While in the clock phase of the CCA, clock prices do the job of coordinating bidders towards nding an (approximately) e cient allocation, in our approach, we use an elicitation process guided by machine learning (ML) to serve this role.
In Section 3, we present the design of our new auction which consist of two separate algorithmic contributions. Our rst contribution is an ML-powered QueryModule (Section 3.1) which, given a set of bundle-value pairs reported by each bidder, determines a new query for each bidder to be answered in the next round of the auction. The QueryModule consists of two key steps. First, given a set of bundle-value reports for each individual bidder, we use an ML algorithm for each bidder to compute an inferred value function for this bidder, which provides us with a prediction of this bidder's value for any bundle in the bundle space. We then compute an e cient allocation based on these inferred valuations, and we use the information from this step to determine the next query for each bidder.
Our second algorithmic contribution is the design of the complete ML-based ICA which we call Pseudo VCG Machine Learning-based (PVML) mechanism (Section 3.2). PVML uses the QueryModule as a sub-routine in every round of the auction and ultimately determines an allocation and payments. PVML is built around two main ideas. We charge "VCG-style payments" and we allow bidders to "push" information to the auction which they deem useful for e ciency. Together, these two design features lead to good incentives in practice.
In Section 4, we provide a detailed theoretical analysis of the properties of PVML. We begin by showing how the performance of the ML algorithm, measured in terms of the learning error, relates to the performance of PVML (Section 4.1). Speci cally, given a bound on the learning error of the ML algorithm, we provide a bound on the e ciency loss incurred by PVML. Furthermore, we provide a price-based interpretation of the elicitation performed by PVML. Even though the bidders only communicate with the mechanism via value reports, we can impute prices to gain insight into how bundles are implicitly priced as the auction proceeds. We then show that PVML obtains an approximate competitive equilibrium, where the approximation depends on the learning error of the ML algorithm.
We then move on to analyze standard mechanism design properties of PVML. In terms of incentives, we rst show that PVML is not ex-post Nash incentive compatible. Similar to other practical CAs like the CCA, this is due to the rich dynamic strategy space of the bidders and the fact that we cannot guarantee nding the e cient allocation. However, we show that PVML is social welfare aligned which means that any bene cial manipulation a bidder nds must increase the social welfare by the same amount. Together with the fact that bidders can "push" self-selected bundle-value pairs to the auction in an initial phase, we argue that this provides PVML with "good incentives in practice. " Concretely, if bidders have certain beliefs about which bundles they should receive as part of a (highly) e cient allocation, then they can simply push those bundles in the initial phase. Afterwards, they should simply answer all value queries truthfully, to enable the mechanism to maximize social welfare (which it is designed to do).
In Section 4.3, we show that PVML satis es individual rationality, i.e., no bidder obtains negative utility by participating in the auction. Finally, in Section 4.4., we study whether PVML can run at a de cit or not. We show that, in principle, it may run at a de cit -although the probability of a de cit occuring depends on how much information the auctioneer elicits from each bidder (and thus, how well she can compute the Pseudo-VCG payments). We then explain that, in practice, an auctioneer who wants to guarantee the node cit property can simply lower-bound each bidder's payment by zero (albeit, at the consequence of slightly relaxing the social welfare alginment property).
While for the description of PVML in Section 3 and the theoretical analysis in Section 4, we can leave the ML algorithm unspeci ed, we nally instantiate it in Section 5. In principle, any ML algorithm could be used within PVML. However, a key requirement is that one can relatively quickly solve the auction's winner determination problem (WDP) based on bidders' inferred valuations, to compute a new allocation -and this computation is done many hundreds of times (inside the QueryModule) throughout one run of PVML. Thus, in our experiments, we limit the execution time for one such WDP computation to 1 minute. In Section 5, we rst explain how standard linear regression can be used to obtain the bidder's inferred valuations, and how formulating the linear regression-based WDP is straightforward. Then we generalize this to non-linear machine learning models that can also capture substitutes and complements valuations -in particular, we use kernelized support vector regression (SVR). We discuss SVRs with four popular kernels: Linear (which corresponds to linear regression), Quadratic, Exponential, and Gaussian, and we provide WDP formulations for all four. Using a di erent kernel in the SVR essentially leads to a di erent ML algorithm inside PVML. In Section 6, we then provide experimental results comparing the performance of these four ML algorithms. Our main insight in this section is that the choice of the right ML algorithm used inside PVML depends on two characteristics: rst, the ML algorithm's prediction performance (measured in terms of the learning error), and second, our ability to solve the ML-based WDP problem reasonably quickly. We show that the four kernels we test di er along those two dimensions. The Exponential kernel leads to the best prediction performance, but it also results in a computationally very di cult WDP, such that we cannot solve the WDP to optimality when computing the allocation inside the QueryModule. In contrast, the Quadratic kernel only has slightly worse prediction performance, but we can formulate the corresponding WDP as a Quadratic Integer program which we can solve relatively quickly, even for large auction instances. This is why in terms of economic e ciency (our main variable of interest), the Quadratic kernel outperforms the other three kernels.
In Section 7, we then present experimental results evaluating the overall performance of PVML (using SVRs with a Quadratic kernel) and we benchmark it against the CCA. For these experiments, we employ the spectrum auction test suite (SATS) Weiss, Lubin and Seuken (2017) , and we use the LSVM, GSVM and MRVM domains. We simulate the CCA with a full clock phase plus an additional supplementary round. The number of bids that bidders submit in the supplementary round is equal to the maximum number of bundle-value pairs that bidders submit in PVML, and we vary that number between 100 and 500.
Our rst result is that, as one would expect, the performance of PVML depends on how well the ML algorithm can capture the structure of the domain. LSVM has a highly non-linear structure, but bidders are not interested in a large number of bundles. In this domain, the CCA achieves slightly higher e ciency than PVML with 500 queries. In contrast, in GSVM, the Quadratic kernel can perfectly capture the structure of the domain, and thus is able to generalize very well. This leads to an e ciency of 100% for PVML, even with only 100 queries, while the CCA only achieves 99.2% with 100 queries.
Finally, we test both mechanisms on the MRVM domain, which is the largest and most realistic domain, with 10 bidders and 98 goods. Here, PVML again clearly outperforms the CCA. With 500 queries, the CCA achieves an e ciency of 93.2% while PVML achieves 94.5%, which is roughly a 1.3% point improvement.
Related Work on Machine Learning and Mechanism Design
There are multiple existing strands of research connecting machine learning with mechanism design. One line of research grew out of the automated mechanism design (AMD) research agenda Sandholm, 2002, 2004) , aiming to use algorithms to design direct-revelation mechanisms: these are mechanisms where agents report all of their preferences upfront and the mechanism determines the outcome based on these preferences. The rst approaches to AMD were based on formulating the mechanism design problem as a search problem over the space of all possible mappings from agents' preference pro les to outcomes. These approaches were only applicable to small settings mainly because of the dimension of the preference pro le space. Recent work has partly addressed this scalability issue by limiting the search to parametrized classes of mechanisms and using learning algorithms to nd suitable parameter values. Dütting et al. (2015) used discriminant-based classi ers to learn approximately strategyproof payment rules for combinatorial auctions. Narasimhan, Agarwal and Parkes (2016) further showed how to extend these techniques to mechanisms that are not allowed to charge payments. In more recent work, Duetting et al. (2018) have used deep learning methods to advance the design of revenue-maximizing auctions. Similar deep learning methods were also applied by Golowich, Narasimhan and Parkes (2018) to design matching mechanisms. The research agenda of using a learning framework to design revenue-maximizing auctions also involves several sample complexity results provided for di erent settings (Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Medina and Mohri, 2014; Cesa-Bianchi, Gentile and Mansour, 2015; Roughgarden, 2015, 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Vitercik, 2016, 2017; Syrgkanis, 2017) . Similarly to AMD, in our work we design mechanisms through algorithms. However, the main di erence lies in our focus of indirect-revelation mechanisms where agents' preferences are iteratively elicited by the mechanism.
Another important research agenda related to this paper is the one of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, which dates back to the early 2000s (Sandholm and Boutilier, 2006) . Among the most relevant work in this agenda are the papers by Lahaie and Parkes (2004) and Blum et al. (2004) which used learning algorithms to design elicitation algorithms for speci c classes of valuations. Elicitation algorithms for generic valuations based on ML were introduced by Lahaie (2011) and further developed by Lahaie and Lubin (2019) . These approaches are based on using ML on bidders' reports to nd competitive equilibrium prices, i.e., prices that coordinate bidders towards demanding e cient allocations. Brero and Lahaie (2018) and Brero, Lahaie and Seuken (2019) built on these mechanisms and designed Bayesian auctions that, besides bidders' reports, can exploit prior beliefs on bidders' valuations to quickly determine competitive equilibrium prices. In contrast to the pre-dominant research agenda in this eld, we do not use ML to directly learn or predict competitive equilibrium prices. Instead, we use ML to learn bidders' valuations, and we only provide an implicit (internal) correspondence to approximate clearing price (but these are never shown to bidders). We use the learned valuations to determine which values should be queried from the bidders in the next round, to ultimately nd a highly e cient allocation. This leads to a very di erent auction protocol, with di erent opportunities for machine learning, di erent challenges that need to be addressed, and di erent resulting properties.
Preliminaries
In this section we present our formal model. We start by introducing the combinatorial auction setting in Subsection 2.1. In Subsection 2.2, we discuss the mechanism design problem we want to solve, its challenges, and the solutions proposed in prior work.
Combinatorial Auctions
In a combinatorial auction (CA), there is a set of m indivisible items being auctioned o to n bidders. We let [n] = {1, ..., n}, so that [n] and [m] denote the index sets of bidders and items, respectively. A bundle is a subset of the set of items. We associate each bundle with its indicator vector and denote the set of bundles as X = {0, 1} m . We represent the preferences of each bidder i with a value function v i : X → R ≥0 that is private knowledge of the bidder. Thus, for each bundle x ∈ X , v i (x) represents the true value that bidder i has for obtaining x. We do not make any assumptions regarding the structure of bidders' value functions. We assume that values are normalized such that the bidders have zero value for the empty bundle. We sometimes also refer to v i as bidder i's valuation. We let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) denote the vector of bidders' valuations and
. . , v n ) the corresponding vector where bidder i is excluded.
A CA determines an allocation and charges payments to the bidders. An allocation is a vector of bundles a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), with a i being the bundle that bidder i obtains under a. An allocation is feasible if each item is allocated to at most one bidder; we denote the set of feasible allocations by F. Payments are de ned as a vector p = (p 1 , ..., p n ) ∈ R n , with p i denoting the amount charged to bidder i. We assume that bidders have a quasi-linear utility function of the form u i (a, p) = v i (a i ) − p i . The social welfare of an allocation a, which we compactly denote as V (a), is the sum of the bidders' true values for a, i.e. i∈ [n] v i (a). The social welfare-maximizing (i.e., e cient) allocation is denoted as a * v ∈ arg max a∈F V (a). We measure the e ciency of any allocation a ∈ F as V (a)/V (a * v ). We aim for the design of mechanisms that maximize e ciency. A CA mechanism de nes how bidders interact with the auction, how the nal allocation is determined, and how much each bidder has to pay. In this paper, we design a mechanism that asks bidders to report values for bundles (across di erent rounds of an auction). We letv i,x denote bidder i's value report on bundle x; we often refer to (x,v i,x ) as a bundle-value pair. Our mechanism will enforce that a bidder cannot make multiple reports on the same bundle. We let s i denote a set of bundle-value pairs reported by bidder i. For notational simplicity, we say that x ∈ s i if (x,v i,x ) ∈ s i . We use |s i | to denote the number of bundle-value pairs in s i .
In general, bidders do not make a value report for all bundles in the bundle space. Therefore, given a set of reported bundle-value pairs by bidder i, s i , we de ne a reported value functionv s i (x) which monotonically extends bidder i's individual value reportsv i,x for bundles x ∈ s i to the whole bundle space assuming free disposal (i.e.,v s i (x) = max{v i,x : x ⊆ x and (x ,v i,x ) ∈ s i }). Thus, formally, every set of bundle-value pairs s i induces a di erent functionv s i (x). To avoid the double subscript notation, going forward, we simply writev i,s (x) forv s i (x).
We let s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) denote the vector of these sets of reported bundle value pairs. Given an s, we can now de ne the reported social welfare of an allocation a as i∈[n]v i,s (a i ). The e cient allocation with respect to s is denoted as a * vs ∈ arg max a∈F i∈[n]v i,s (a i ). Without loss of generality, we only consider allocations a * vs that consist of bundles contained in s.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism
We now de ne the well-known VCG mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) which is the gold standard to allocate items e ciently in a CA.
De nition 1 (VCG Mechanism). Under VCG, every bidder i must make a report about its full value function, which we denote byv i . VCG allocates allocates items according to a * v ∈ arg max a iv i (a i ) and charges each bidder i payment
It is well known that VCG is strategyproof, i.e., it is a dominant strategy for all bidders to report their true value function, independent of what the other bidders do. This can easily be seen by considering that bidder i's utility under VCG is equal to
Bidder i cannot a ect the last term j =iv j (a * v −i ), and the sum of the rst two terms is equal to reported social welfare, which is maximized by the mechanism. Thus, it is dominant strategy for bidder i to report his true value function. When all bidders follow their dominant strategy, VCG is e cient.
Iterative VCG Mechanisms
VCG is often considered an impractical mechanism for CAs, in particular in domains with a large number of items, because it requires bidders to report their full value function (which is exponentially sized in the number of items). Fortunately, it has been shown that one does not always need to elicit the full value functions to determine the VCG outcome (Mishra and Parkes, 2007) . Building on this insight, researchers have proposed iterative VCG mechanisms (e.g., Mishra and Parkes (2007) ; de Vries, Schummer and Vohra (2007) ). The idea of these mechanisms is to interact with bidders over multiple rounds and, when bidders follow truthful bidding behavior (suitably de ned), to only elicit enough information to determine the VCG outcome with respect to their true valuation at the end of the auction.
Intuitively, by realizing the VCG outcome, these mechanisms inherit some good incentive properties of VCG. In fact, such mechanisms support truthful bidding in ex-post Nash equilibrium (Mishra and Parkes, 2007; de Vries, Schummer and Vohra, 2007) . However, given that iterative VCG mechanisms increase the strategy space (where bidders may now condition their actions on progress throughout the auction), we lose the strong guarantees of VCG based on dominant strategies.
The Pseudo VCG Machine Learning-based Mechanism
In this section, we introduce our new mechanism. As mentioned in the previous section, our primary design goal is to achieve high e ciency. Unfortunately, it is well known that nding the e cient allocation requires communication that is exponential in the number of items in the worst case (Nisan and Segal, 2006) . Furthermore, it has been shown that you cannot even achieve a useful approximation of e ciency with less than exponential worst-case communication. Note that this implies that iterative VCG mechanisms (e.g., Mishra and Parkes, 2007; de Vries, Schummer and Vohra, 2007 ) also require exponential communication in the worst case and are thus impractical even in medium-sized domains.
To obtain a practical CA, we design a mechanism that, like iterative VCG, interacts with bidders over multiple rounds, but that imposes a strict limit on the information exchanged between each bidder and the auction. Note that the amount and the type of information being exchanged depends on the auction format and thus the type of queries that are used. Many iterative CAs use demand queries where bidders are shown ask prices and have to report their pro t-maximizing bundle at these prices. The amount of information exchanged per demand query depends on the dimensionality of the ask prices. For example, the CCA uses linear prices (i.e., one price per item), which, combined with a bound on the number of rounds, ensures practicality. Note that, due to the result by Nisan and Segal (2006) , this also implies that the CCA cannot provide e ciency guarantees.
In our mechanism, the information exchanged consists of a small set of bundle-value pairs from each bidder, and the size of this set is limited via a parameter of our mechanism. Of course, due to Nisan and Segal (2006) , this implies that our mechanism also cannot provide useful e ciency guarantees. However, our goal is to design a mechanism that maximizes empirical e ciency in realistic CA domains.
Intuitively, a mechanism that wants to maximize empirical e ciency but is constrained on information exchange should elicit the "most important" information from each bidder. However, in an iterative mechanism, identifying the "next most-useful query" is not an easy task because it requires reasoning about the incremental value of the missing information given what has already been elicited. To this end, there are three basic approaches. First, if enough structure regarding bidders' value functions can be assumed ex ante, then the auctioneer can use this structure to generalize one piece of information from bidders to a large part of the bidders' value functions. However, in this work, we allow for general valuations such that our mechanism does not rely on any critical structural assumptions.
Second, instead of the auctioneer performing the generalization task by exploiting structural assumptions, the bidders can do it themselves by explicitly providing information statements about their whole value function. The CCA follows this principle by asking bidders demand queries in each round of the clock phase. An answer to a demand query does not only provide the auctioneer with information on one bundle, but it is simultaneously a statement regarding the bidder's whole value function. The auctioneer can then use these "global information statements" to identify the next query. For example, the CCA computes the next query via a simple price update rule where prices on over-demanded items are increased by a xed percentage (Ausubel and Baranov, 2017) .
In this work, we propose a third approach to perform the generalization task, using machine learning (ML). The idea is to train an ML algorithm for each individual bidder on that bidder's value reports to generalize to the whole bundle space, i.e., to infer a value for each bundle the bidder has not evaluated yet. For example, consider a bidder who reported value 1 for bundle (1, 0) and value 10 for bundle (1, 1). To build some intuition, consider simple linear regression, which in this example would predict value 9 for bundle (0, 1). Of course, linear regression can only learn additive value functions as it only has one coe cient per item. In Section 5, we present our general ML framework and explain how non-linear ML algorithms (which can capture substitute and complements valuations) can be employed in our mechanism. Equipped with an ML algorithm, we can take the bundle-value reports obtained from each bidder, feed them to the ML algorithm to generalize to the whole bundle space. As in approaches 1 and 2, this provides the auctioneer with a statement about the whole value function which can then be used to compute the next query. In Section 3.1, we describe in detail our machine learning-powered "QueryModule" which takes as input a set of bundle-value pairs from each bidder and determines a new query for each bidder. In Section 3.2 we present our full ML-powered mechanism, which uses the QueryModule as a sub-routine in every round of the auction, and which ultimately determines the nal allocation and payments. Recall that, due to the result by Nisan and Segal (2006) , we cannot provide e ciency guarantees while maintaining practicality, which implies that we cannot determine the VCG outcome. While this implies that we cannot achieve the good e ciency and incentive guarantees of iterative VCG mechanisms, we nevertheless follow the design principles of VCG to obtain a mechanism that provides bidders with "good incentives in practice. " Concretely, we charge "VCG-style payments" and we allow bidders to "push" information to the auction which they deem useful for e ciency. Together, these two design features lead to good incentives in practice, as we will show in detail in Section 4.
Machine Learning-powered ery Module
In this section, we describe in detail our QueryModule (see Figure 1 for a schematic view). The module takes as input a set of bundle-value pairs s i from each bidder i. Then, for each bidder i a ML algorithm A is trained based s i to infer a value functionṽ i . 1 The inferred value functions are then used by the optimization algorithm to compute an e cient allocation with respect to the inferred valuations. The module assigns each bidder i a new query q i given by the bundle she obtains under this allocation. 2 Algorithm 1 provides a detailed description of our query module. Formally, we represent our query module as a function NextQuery(A, s) which takes as input a machine learning algorithm A and a set of bundle-value pairs s i from each bidder i. As we will describe in Section 3.2, our mechanism calls our query module on di erent subgroups of bidders called economies. To emphasize this aspect, in Algorithm 1 we denote the set 
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. Our algorithm begins with the "Estimation
Step": for each bidder i ∈ [k] the ML algorithm A is trained based on the bundle-value pairs s i to infer a value functionṽ i (Line 3). Then, for each bidder i ∈ [k] our algorithm determines a set F i consisting of those feasible allocations that do not assign bidder i a bundle she has already evaluated in s i (Line 6). In the "Optimization
Step" an optimization algorithm is evoked to determine the allocationã in F i achieving the highest social welfare according toṽ (Line 7). The algorithm assigns each bidder i the new query q i =ã i (Line 8). Once a new query has been assigned to each bidder i in [k], Algorithm 1 outputs the vector of queries q.
The PVML Mechanism
In this subsection, we describe our PVML mechanism. PVML uses the query module introduced in Section 3.1 to determine a highly e cient allocation and charge "VCG style payments". These payments are obtained by charging each bidder i the di erence between the overall value realized by the other bidders in an allocation elicited excluding bidder i and the one they realize in the nal allocation. We call the group of all bidders other than i bidder i's marginal economy -which di erentiates from the main economy consisting of all bidders. 3 As we will see in Section 4, charging these VCG-style payments while allowing bidders to submit self chosen bundle-value pairs motivates bidders to report true values throughout the auction. Algorithm 2 provides a formal description of PVML. The mechanism is parametrized by a machine learning algorithm A that will be given as input to the function NextQuery, a maximum number Q max of value reports that it is allowed to ask each bidder, and a maximum number Q 0 of value reports that can be selected by a bidder in the rst stage of the auction. When the auction begins, the mechanism asks each bidder i to report Q push i ≤ Q 0 self-chosen bundle-value pairs (Line 1) and obtains the remaining Q 0 − Q push i reports by asking her values for randomly-selected bundles (Line 2). The set of bundle value pairs obtained from each bidder i is denoted as s 0 i . PVML uses these bundle-value pairs to initialize n + 1 vector of reports, one related to the main economy (Line 3) and one for each marginal economy (Line 4). Then, while the mechanism is allowed 
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to ask up to n queries to any bidder without violating the query budget Q max , the following procedure is iterated: First, the mechanism invokes the function NextQuery on the value reports corresponding to the main economy (Line 8) and on the ones corresponding to each marginal economy (Line 9). 4 All the queries generated in Line 8 and 9 are sent to the bidders that are asked to report the corresponding values (Line 10).
The new vector of reports obtained is integrated in the set of queries corresponding to the main economy (Line 11). Each vector or reports corresponding to the queries generated for a marginal economy in Line 9 is integrated in the reports for this economy (Line 12). When the iterations stop, PVML determines its nal allocation and payments: The nal allocation a pvml is the value-maximizing allocation given all the reports obtained in the elicitation for the main economy (Line 14). The payment p pvml i charged to each bidder i is given by the di erence between the overall value realized in the optimal allocation for the values elicited in his marginal economy and the one the other bidders realize in a pvml (Line 15).
Remark 1 (Answering Value Queries with Upper and Lower bounds).
Note that in PVML bidders need to report exact values for the bundles queried in Line 10 of Algorithm 2. However, in practice it may be easier for bidders to specify bounds on bundle values than to determine such values precisely (see, e.g., Parkes, 2006) . In Brero, Lubin and Seuken (2018) we have introduced a modi ed machine learning-based elicitation algorithm that works when bidders report upper and lower bounds instead of exact values. Via simulations we have shown that our ML-powered elicitation algorithm determines highly e cient allocations even under these less informative reports. A new PVML version based on this algorithm can be designed in future work.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we analyze which theoretical properties PVML satis es.
Learning Error and Elicitation Guarantees
The prediction performance of an ML algorithm is usually assessed via its learning error. Formally, for a bidder i, we de ne the learning error in a bundle x as the absolute value of the di erence between the bidder's true value and the inferred value for the bundle x, i.e.: err(x) = |v i (x)−ṽ i (x)|. Of course, in practice, an auctioneer cannot evaluate the learning error because she does not have access to the true valuations. However, she can evaluate the ML algorithm using prior auction data. In general, the better the ML algorithm captures the domain, the smaller the learning errors can be expected. In Section 6, we evaluate the learning error of four di erent ML algorithms and show how they depend on the richness of the ML model used.
In this section, we still leave the ML algorithm unspeci cied to derive theoretical properties that hold for any ML algorithm. We show how the performance of the ML algorithm, measured in terms of the learning error, relates to the performance of PVML. Speci cally, given a bound on the learning error, we rst derive a bound on the e ciency of PMVL, and then we show how we can impute prices to obtain an approximate competitive equilibrium.
Bounding the E iciency Loss
First we use the learning error to bound the e ciency loss of PVML. Consider the QueryModule described in Algorithm 1. In Line 5, we compute a * v , i.e., the e cient allocation with respect to the inferred valuation pro leṽ. We then use this allocation in Line 8 to assign a new query for each bidder (unless the bidder has already reported a value for the corresponding bundle). Thus, at the end of the QueryModule, PVML ensures that all bundles contained in a * v have been queried and will ultimately be used to compute the nal allocation. This implies that the e ciency of PVML can only only be (weakly) higher than the e ciency of a * v , assuming that all bidders only make truthful bundle-value reports. Thus, a bound on the e ciency loss for any speci c a * v translates into a bound on the e ciency loss of PVML.
Proposition 1. Letṽ be an inferred valuation pro le. Let a * v be an e cient allocation w.r.t. toṽ, and let a * v be an e cient allocation w.r.t. the true valuation pro le. Assume that the learning errors in the bundles of these two allocations are bounded as follows: for each bidder i,
Then the following bound on the e ciency loss in a * v holds:
Proof. We add and subtract
Given that a * v is a social welfare-maximizing allocation underṽ, the term
positive. Inequality (4) follows considering that any real number cannot be greater than its absolute value.
In words, Proposition 1 shows us that the e ciency loss in a * v is bounded by the overall learning error in the two allocations a * v and a * v (normalized by the maximum social welfare). While the e cient allocation a * v is not known to the auctioneer, she does know a * v at each round of PVML. This provides some motivation for the design of our QueryModule. Consider the allocationã which Algorithm 1 determines in Line 5. The bound from Proposition 1 increases in the learning errors in each bidder's bundleã i . This motivates Line 8 of Algorithm 1, where we query every bidder the bundleã i ; if the allocation remained stable in the next round, there are no more learning errors due toã that contribute to the bound (when using an ML algorithm that is accurate on the training data). If a bidder i has previously reported a value for bundleã i , then this means that there are no "obvious" queries to ask this bidder. Consequently, Algorithm 1 then enters the "else-branch" to determine a new allocation where the winner determination algorithm is restricted to only allocate a bundle to this bidder which he has not reported a value for yet.
Learning Error and Imputed Approximate Clearing Prices
Recall that in PVML, bidders submit bundle-value reports, while most prior work on iterative CAs uses prices for elicitation. We now show how we can obtain a price-based interpretation of the elicitation performed by PVML's QueryModule. In particular, we show how we can impute prices that are implicit in the elicitation. Given a bound on the learning error of the ML algorithm, we then provide a measure on the quality of these imputed prices. Concretely, we measure the quality of these prices by using the concept of competitive equilibrium.
To de ne a competitive equilibrium, we introduce a very general concept of prices (allowing for nonanonymous bundle prices). We let π = (π 1 , .., π n ) denote the price pro le, where each π i is bidder i's price function, with π i (x) denoting bidder i's price for any given bundle x ∈ X . Given this, we can now de ne a competitive equilibrium (CE).
De nition 2 (Competitive equilibrium). Given prices π, we de ne each bidder i's demand set d π i as the set of bundles that maximize her utility at π:
. Similarly, we can de ne the seller's supply set s π as the set of allocations that are most pro table at π: s π = arg max a∈F i π i (a i ). We say that prices π and allocation a are in competitive equilibrium if a ∈ s π and, for each bidder i, a i ∈ d π i .
It is well known that any competitive equilibrium allocation is e cient (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, 16.C-D) . Prior work on iterative CAs has exploited this property. For example, the iterative VCG mechanisms by Mishra and Parkes (2007) and de Vries, Schummer and Vohra (2007) iteratively update prices until a CE is found. 5 This approach is motivated by the fact that any auction that nds an e cient allocation must reveal CE prices (Nisan and Segal, 2006) . However, in the worst case, this may require an exponential amount of communication (potentially quoting a di erent price for each bundle).
Recall that in PVML, we limit the amount of information exchanged (via the query cap). Thus, due to the result by Nisan and Segal (2006) , we cannot guarantee nding a CE. In fact, PVML does not even use prices to interact with bidders (in contrast to the CCA or iterative VCG mechanisms). However, at each round of the auction, we can impute prices based on the inferred valuations in that round. This provides insight into how bundles are being implicitly priced in each round of PVML.
Concretely, ifṽ is the inferred valuation pro le with respect to all bundle-value pairs reported so far, then one can impute a price pro le π =ṽ for the current round. 6 To measure the quality of this imputed price pro le, we use the concept of approximate competitive equilibrium prices (see, e.g., Brero and Lahaie, 2018) . Speci cally, given a bound on the learning error of the ML algorithm, we can bound the degree of approximation in the equilibrium price pro le. Proposition 2. Letṽ be an inferred valuation pro le and a * v be an e cient allocation. Assume that the learning errors are bounded as follows: for each bidder i,
Then, we need to inject at most n(δ 1 + δ 2 ) into the market to induce the bidders and the seller to trade the allocation a * v at prices π =ṽ, i.e.,ṽ is a n(δ 1 + δ 2 )-approximate competitive equilibrium price pro le.
Proof. The transfer that should be made to the seller to trade a * v at pricesṽ is i∈
. After summing up all these transfers we obtain a total transfer
Note that, by adding and subtracting i∈[n]ṽ i (a * v ) to the second term in Equation (6) we have that
We can then use our assumptions to conclude that δ ≤ n(δ 1 +δ 2 ).
Proposition 2 provides us with a measure on the quality of the price pro le π =ṽ. Concretely, it tells us how close to clearing this price vector is as a function of the learning error of the ML algorithm. 7 We want to emphasize that these imputed prices are only implicit when PVML is run. Importantly, they inherit the structure ofṽ, which can be very complex, depending on the ML algorithm used. In particular, the prices will in general be non-anonymous, and if we use high-dimensional (non-linear) ML algorithms, then they will also be high-dimension bundle prices. Note that this implict high-dimensional price structure enables PVML to nd an approximate CE (where the approximation depends on the learning error of the ML algorithm) while approaches based on linear prices may severely limited.
Introducing this price-based interpretation of our QueryModule allows us to explain how our mechanism is related to the work by Lahaie and Parkes (2004) who were among the rst to establish a theoretical connection between preference elicitation in CAs and machine learning. In this prior work, they proposed an iterative ML-based elicitation paradigm which also uses inferred valuations to drive the elicitation process. However, while PVML is based on value reports, their algorithm critically requires demand queries (i.e., it communicates ask prices to bidders in every round). The advantage of their approach is that it guarantees nding a competitive equilibrium. However, due to the result by Nisan and Segal (2006) , if their approach was applied in a general setting, it would require communicating exponentially-sized prices to the agents in every round, which makes it impractical in such settings.
In contrast to the approach by Lahaie and Parkes (2004) , the CCA is designed with practical applications in mind (like PVML). A guiding pricinple underlying the clock phase of the CCA is that it aims to nd approximate CE prices. However, as a practical mechanism, it cannot use exponential communication; instead, it uses linear prices and a limited number of rounds. Thus, due to Nisan and Segal (2006) , it cannot guarantee nding a true CE. Note that the supplementary round of the CCA (allowing bidders to submit up to 500 bundle-value pairs in one nal round) is designed to address the potential ine ciencs that remain at the end of the clock phase (e.g., due to using linear prices that may be out of equilibrium). Note that both, PVML and CCA are practical auction designs, but they restrict the amount of information exchanged in di erent ways. Furthermore, while the CCA explicitly aims to nd an approximate CE by using demand queries, PVML can be interpreted as doing so implicitly by using an ML algorithm on value reports.
Incentives
We now analyze the incentive properties of PVML. Speci cally, we show how charging the VCG-style payments of Equation 3 while allowing bidders to push some bundle-value pairs at the beginning of the auction motivates bidders to follow truthful strategies, which we de ne as follows:
De nition 3 (Truthful Strategy). We say that a bidder is truthful under PVML if, when a bidder i adopts this strategy during the auction, he
• always reports his true values for the bundles explicitly queried by PVML, and
• he only pushes bundle-value pairs (x,v ix ) withv ix = v i (x).
As described in Section 4.1.1, PVML is only guaranteed to nd highly e cient allocations when bidders report their values truthfully (assuming that the ML algorithm A accurately captures bidders' valuations). Thus, we want to provider bidders with good incentives to follow a truthful strategy. Unfortunately, as shown by the following proposition, PVML allows a bidder to increase her nal utility by misreporting some of her values, even when the other bidders are truthful. Proof. To show this result, we need to carefully execute one run of PVML (over multiple rounds) for one speci c auction instance. Consider a setting with 2 bidders and 2 items. We use PVML with linear regression, which in this setting estimates 2 coe cients (one per item). The PVML parameters are set as follows: Q max = 3 and Q 0 = 1. Bidder 1's true values are v 1 (1, 0) = v 1 (1, 1) = 2, v 1 (0, 1) = 1.1, and bidder 2's ones are v 2 (1, 0) = v 2 (0, 1) = 1, v 2 (1, 1) = 2.
Implicitly, PVML assumes a report from both of zero for the empty bundle. Additionally, assume that in Line 1 of Algorithm 2, bidder 2 truthfully reportsv 2,(1,1) = 2. Assume that in Line 1 bidder 1 truthfully reportsv 1,(0,1) = 1.1. After the initialization in Lines 3 and 4, we have: 1) , 2)}. The valuations inferred in the Estimation Step of the query module are:ṽ 1 (1, 0) = 0 andṽ 1 (0, 1) =ṽ 1 (1, 1) = 1.1, andṽ 2 (1, 0) =ṽ 2 (0, 1) = 1, andṽ 2 (1, 1) = 2. Under this inference, bidder 1 is assigned query (1, 1) in both the main and bidder 2's marginal economy, while bidder 2 is assigned query (1, 0) in both the main and bidder 1's marginal economy (assuming ties are broken in favor of the rst item). If bidders are truthful, in Line 11 the two value reportsv 1,(1,1) = 2 andv 2,(1,0) = 1 are included in the corresponding sets of bundle-value pairs. When the auction ends, bidder 1 is allocated bundle (0, 1) and charged p pvml 1 = 1, with utility equal to 1.1 − 1 = 0.1. If bidder 1 had reportedv 1,(0,1) = 0.9, the valuationṽ 1 inferred in the Estimation Step of the query module would have beenṽ 1 (1, 0) = 0 andṽ 1 (0, 1) =ṽ 1 (1, 1) = 0.9, and he would have been assigned query (1, 0) in the main economy, obtaining this bundle in the nal allocation for a payment equal to 1. Then, his utility would have been 2 − 1 = 1 > 0.1.
Remark 2 (Robustness Against Strategic Manipulation in Practice)
. While PVML is not robust against manipulations, we note that nding a bene cial manipulation of the kind described above may be very di cult for bidders. Indeed, if we look again at the proof, we notice that bidder 1 can only successfully perform his manipulation because he has perfect information about the current state of the auction (all reported bundles and the inferred valuations) and because he knows which values bidder 2 is going to report. To make PVML more robust to strategic manipulations in practice, we suggest prohibiting bidders from communicating with each others during the auction (as is common in practical auction designs). Furthermore, in Line 10 of the PVML mechanism, we suggest sending the list of new queries to each bidder as an un-ordered list of queries, such that a bidder cannot deduce which queries belong to the main or marginal economies, respectively. We argue that, from a practical perspective, this makes it even harder for a bidder to nd a bene cial manipulation because it is now very di cult for a bidder to estimate the impact of any manipulation. This idea is similar to the one presented in Parkes (2001) and, as discussed by Parkes (2001) , it can also hinder collusion or spiteful behaviors.
Note that allowing bidders to push bundle-value pairs in the initial round of PVML makes the manipulation described in the proof of Proposition 3 unnatural. Instead of misreporting his value for bundle (0, 1) to ultimately be queried and allocated bundle (1, 0), bidder 1 could just push bundle-value pair (1, 0) in the initial round, and then report truthfully afterwards. In fact, this ability to push bundle-value pairs is an important design feature of PVML, as it makes many manipulations unnatural. We argue that this design feature of PVML together with the VCG-style payment rule, leads to the good incentives in practice. To make this notion more formal, we now rst introduce some new notation.
We denote as σ i a generic strategy for bidder i, determining the behavior of the bidder at any point throughout the auction (which of course depends on his valuation and any other information available to the bidder). We let σ denote the bidders' strategy pro le. We use τ i to denote a truthful strategy, i.e., a strategy where bidder i always reports truthful values, and we let τ denote the corresponding truthful strategy pro le. A CA mechanism f is de ned as follows: f (σ) = g(σ), h(σ) over strategy pro les σ, where g(σ) outputs the allocation, and h(σ) outputs the payment pro le. With this we can now de ne the following property.
De nition 4 (Social Welfare Alignment). A mechanism f = g, h is social welfare aligned if, for all bidders i ∈ [n], given a truthful strategy pro le τ = (τ i , τ −i ), for any strategy σ i = τ i , the following holds:
The following result is now straightforward.
Proposition 4. PVML is social welfare aligned.
Proof. Given PVML mechanism f pvml = g pvml , h pvml , by plugging in the payment formulation of PVML, the utility of each bidder i, when the other bidders follow a truthful strategy pro le τ −i , can be written as
where a pvml = g pvml (σ i , τ −i ). Note that, when the other bidders are truthful, bidder i cannot a ect a (−i) . Thus, PVML is social welfare aligned. 8
Discussion. Now that we have shown that PVML satis es social welfare alignment, we have all pieces in place to argue that PVML provides bidders with good incentives in practice. By "good incentives in practice"
we mean that a bidder should follow the following simple strategy: (a) in the initial phase, push bundles you are interested in winning and that you think you have a chance of winning, (b) only make truthful value reports. If the query cap for the initial round Q max is su ciently large (e.g., 50-100), then in practice, bidders would have a lot of opportunity to provide (push) their initial knowledge to the auctioneer. In this argument, we take as a baseline the benchmark where PVML simply queries bidders randomly in the initial round and where bidders answer all queries truthfully. There are two cases to consider. First, the simple case, when a bidder does not have any knowledge or belief that he can manipulate in a way such as to increase the e ciency of the nal allocation compared to the baseline. In this case, it follows from the fact that PVML is social welfare aligned that the bidder is best o to simply report truthfully.
For the second case, assume the bidder has knowledge (or a belief) about which allocations could lead to a better social welfare than the baseline. Then the bidder could try to execute a sophisticated manipulation (with the goal of getting PVML to eventually implement that allocation). It would be better if the bidder could directly push this allocation to the auctioneer and be truthful afterwards. However, in practice, it is unlikely that bidders will be able to identify (or form beliefs about) about complete allocation (which requires an assignment of one bundle per bidder) with higher social welfare than the one PVML would determine by default, while it is more reasonable to assume that bidders can form beliefs regarding which bundles they will likely receive as part of highly e cient allocations. Thus, by letting bidder push those bundles to the mechanism, the mechanism can do the job of guring out the remaining piece of the allocation (and it is designed to do this well). This provides the bidder with the incentive to push those bundles and report truthfully afterwards.
Individual Rationality
A mechanism is individually rational if each bidder's payment is less than or equal to the bidder's reported value for his nal allocation. We can show:
Proposition 5. PVML satis es individual rationality.
Proof. We show that, for each bidder i,v i (a pvml ) − p pvml i ≥ 0. From the de nition of the PVML payment rule this is equivalent to j∈[n]v j (a pvml ) − j =iv j (a (−i) ) ≥ 0. This holds because a pvml is optimized over the query pro lev that includesv (−i) used to compute a (−i) .
No-Deficit
Ideally, a mechanism stipulating transfers between its participants and the center should not run a de cit. However, PVML (as de ned in Section 3) does not guarantee the no de cit property. From Equation (3) we note that each payment p pvml i is expected to be positive because the allocation a (−i) is derived as an optimal allocation for the marginal economy excluding bidder i. But it may be the case that the allocation a pvml happens to achieve higher reported social welfare with respect to the setting excluding bidder i than a (−i) . When this happens, our mechanism may run a de cit.
Although a de cit violation is formally possible in PVML, we did not observe observe any in the experiments we describe in Section 7 (when su ciently many queries are allowed). However, for a practical implementation of PVML, most auctioneers would likely want a guarantee that the mechanism does not run a de cit. To obtain this guarantee we can simply lower bound each bidder's payment by zero (or by a reserve price), i.e., we charge each bidder i a payment equal to max(0, p pvml i ). Note, however, that lower-bounding the bidders' payments this way implies that the resulting mechanism is no longer (formally) social welfarealigned. If the auctioneer chooses a su ciently large number of queries, this violation of social welfare alignment is likely to be negligible for incentives in practice.
Instantiating the Machine Learning Algorithm
So far, our presentation of PVML has been agnostic regarding which particular ML algorithm to use in the elicitation module. However, this choice is very important because it determines not only the quality of the queries identi ed by Algorithm 1, but also whether running this algorithm is computationally practical. Indeed, each time the module Elicit A is called, the mechanism may need to determine up to n + 1 social welfare-maximizing allocations for the inferred valuations, each time under di erent constraints. In general, determining each of these allocations may require evaluating exponentially many allocations, and the evaluation of each allocation a requires applying A once per bidder i to derive eachṽ i (a). However, if the learning model exhibits useful structure, we can exploit this structure when searching for the social welfaremaximizing allocations.
In this section, we present di erent learning models that can be integrated into our mechanism while keeping its computations practical. In Section 5.1, we start from the simple linear regression model. While computationally convenient, this learning model cannot capture complementarities between items, which prevents Algorithm 1 from inferring highly e cient allocations in settings where such complementarities are important. In Section 5.2 we introduce more expressive learning models, i.e., learning models able to capture more complex valuations. We show how our elicitation can be maintained computationally practical even under these new models.
Linear Regression
In linear regression, each inferred value functionṽ i has the linear structurẽ
where w i ∈ R m is the weight vector corresponding toṽ i . 9 Note that, given a weight vector w i , each w ij represents bidder i's inferred value for item j. A rst, simple approach to determineṽ i (x) is to interpolate bidder i's
. We can then use a standard squared loss function L 2 (y,ỹ) = (y −ỹ) 2 to quantify the interpolation error between observation y and predictionỹ, and choose our weight vector as
Note that this simple approach does not provide a full characterization of w i and, consequently, of bidder i's inferred valuation. We then add the extra term ||w i || 2 = w i · w i to the objective in (9), obtaining a convex problem. This technique is generally called Tikhonov regularization (Tikhonov and Arsenin, 1977) , and it biases the inference towards valuations with low weights w ij . This new learning model is called regularized linear regression and determines the weight vector as
where c > 0 de nes the tradeo between interpolation accuracy and regularization. Note that regularized linear regression avoids inferring unnecessary high values for items that are not contained in any bundle evaluated by bidder i.
When valuations are inferred via regularized linear regression, the optimization problem to determinẽ a ∈ arg max a∈F i∈[n]ṽ i (a) can be formulated as an integer programing problem (IP). The IP has n · m boolean variables a ij , each denoting whether bidder i should get item j under allocation a, and m feasibility constraints enforcing that each item j is not allocated more than once:
To limit this search problem to the allocations of the set F i de ned in Line 10 of Algorithm 1, it is su cient to add an integer cut j∈ [m] |x ij − a ij | ≥ 1 for each bundle x in s i . While integer programming problems are NP-hard, using branch and bound algorithms (Land and Doig, 1960) as implemented by modern IP solving softwares such as CPLEX (CPLEX, 2019) allows us to solve Problem (11) in few milliseconds even for large auction instances with 98 items and 10 bidders. Despite being computationally very convenient, linear regression models have a major drawback, i.e., they cannot capture valuations where items are complements or substitutes. 10 In the next section, we introduce a learning model that generalizes linear regression and allows to capture a broader class of valuations.
Support Vector Regression
Support vector regression (SVR) is a learning model that allows for non-linear inference while maintaining the computations in PVML practical. In this subsection we present the most important properties of SVR. We defer to Smola and Schölkopf (2004) for a detailed introduction.
To infer non-linear valuations, SVR algorithms project our bundle encodings in R m into a high (possibly in nite) dimensional feature space R f . This projection is determined via a mapping function ϕ : R m → R f that is a parameter of the learning model. Each valuation function is then derived via linear regression in the feature space asṽ
where w i ∈ R f . The weight vector w i minimizes a potential similar to the one in (10), with the important di erence that the squared loss is replaced by the ε-insensitive loss L ε (y,ỹ) = max{|y −ỹ| − ε, 0}, where ε ≥ 0 is a parameter of the model. 11 As we will discuss below, the ε-insensitive loss allows to maintain the representation of the inferred valuation succinct. In standard machine learning applications, this is useful to speed up each evaluationṽ i (x). In our application, the ε-insensitive loss allows to maintain our mechanism computationally practical. We can now formulate the learning problem under SVRs as follows:
When the dimensionality of the feature space is low, w i can be determined using standard simplex algorithms, as for linear regression. However, SVR algorithms may involve high dimensional feature spaces, meaning that it is often impractical to determineṽ i via its weight vector. In this scenario, it is convenient to derivẽ v i via the dual version of the learning problem presented in (13), which is formulated in i pairs of variables α ik and α * ik ; these variables are the Lagrange multipliers of the two constraints w i · ϕ(x ik ) ≤v ik + ε and
Once the optimal α i and α * i are determined, the inferred valuation can be formulated as
where the function κ(x, x ) = ϕ(x) · ϕ(x ) is commonly called kernel function, and it implicitly computes the scalar product of x and x in the feature space. When the kernel function can be evaluated via closed formulas, SVR algorithms derive non-linear valuation functionsṽ i while avoiding computations in high dimensional feature spaces. Once a kernel function is selected, the optimization problemã ∈ arg max a∈F i∈[n]ṽ i (a) can be formulated as:
The kernel functions commonly used belong to the following two classes (Williams and Rasmussen, 2006 , chapter 4):
• dot-product kernel functions κ(x, x ) = κ(x · x ), and
• radial basis kernel functions (RBF kernels) κ(x, x ) = κ(||x − x ||).
In Appendix A, we present the integer programming formulations of Problem (16) for dot-product and RBF kernels. In our application we consider three kernel functions (apart from the linear one) selected based on two criteria: 1. the expressivity of the corresponding learning model (which is determined by the implicit feature mapping ϕ), and 2. the complexity of the corresponding instantiation of Problem (16).
The rst kernel function is the Gaussian kernel, which is commonly used in the machine learning literature:
De nition 5 (Gaussian Kernel). A Gaussian kernel is a kernel function of the form
where λ is a non-negative parameter.
The Gaussian kernel is an RBF kernel with the important property that its induced learning model is fully expressive, i.e., it can potentially capture any valuation function a bidder may have.
The second kernel function we consider is the Exponential kernel, which is also fully expressive but, unlike the Gaussian one, is a dot-product kernel.
De nition 6 (Exponential Kernel). An Exponential kernel is a kernel function of the form
Last, we consider the Quadratic kernel:
De nition 7 (Quadratic Kernel). A Quadratic kernel is a kernel function of the form
The Quadratic kernel is not fully expressive; still, it allows to formulate Problem (16) as a quadratic programming problem with boolean variables, which can be practically solved via branch and bound methods (Lima and Grossmann, 2017) . As discussed in Appendix A, we can keep the IP formulations of Problem (16) succinct using a large ε when inferring eachṽ i . However, this ε may need to be too large to maintain our computations practical, which makes Quadratic kernels very appealing.
Experiments I: Optimizing the Machine Learning Algorithm
In order to evaluate PVML, we need to identify the kernel and parameters that work well for the machine learning algorithm. Before evaluating the full mechanism in the next section, we here perform a series of experiments to identify optimal settings.
Setup
In order to run these experiments we need data with which to exercise the mechanism. The allocation of spectrum is one of the most important applications of CAs. We therefore adopt the allocation of spectrum for our experimental evaluation. To do this, we employ the Spectrum Auction Test Suite (SATS) version 0.6.4 (Weiss, Lubin and Seuken, 2017) , which allows us to easily generate thousands of auction instances on demand. SATS gives us access to each bidder's true values across all 2 m bundles, and it enables us to implicitly (without enumeration) compute an e cient allocation with respect to these full value pro les using succinct MIP formulations. This is important, as it enables to to report the e ciency of mechanisms with respect to a gold standard counter-factual calculation of the total social welfare obtainable in the domain. We tested our approach on three of SATS' value models across a range of complexity. We describe each in turn below:
• The Global Synergy Value Model (GSVM) (Goeree and Holt, 2008) generates medium-sized instances with 18 items and 7 bidders. GSVM models the items (spectrum licenses) as being arranged in two circles. Depending on her type, a bidder may be interested in licenses from di erent circles and has a value that depends on the total number of licenses of interest. GSVM also includes a "global" bidder with interest in two thirds of the total licenses.
• The Local Synergy Value Model (LSVM) (Sche el, Ziegler and Bichler, 2012) also generates mediumsized instances with 18 items and 6 bidders. In LSVM the items are placed on a two-dimensional grid, and a bidder's value depends on a sigmoid function of the number of contiguous licenses near a target item of interest.
• The Multi-Region Value Model (MRVM) (Weiss, Lubin and Seuken, 2017) generates large instances with 98 items and 10 bidders. MRVM captures large settings, such as US and Canadian auctions, by modeling the licenses as being arranged in multiple regions and bands. Bidders' values are a ected by both geography and frequency dimensions of the licenses. Depending on the type and on the number of licenses of interest, bidders are categorized as national, regional or local.
In order to implement our machine learning algorithm and mechanism allocation procedures, we need to be be able to solve mixed integer programs (MIPs). In our experiments, we used CPLEX 12.9 (CPLEX, 2019) for this purpose. Experimentally we need to evaluate several di erent mechanism design choices, and do so with enough data points for statistical sign cance. Consequently in our experiments we ran an enormous number of MIPs (approximately 2, 000, 000). Accordingly, we adopt a modest timeout for the solver, which we set to 1 minute, and adopt the best solution found so far. We note that in practical use, auctioneers will typically have more time to let the optimizer run (typically at least an hour), which would improve the outcome of our mechanisms; we thus report conservative results with respect to the optimality of the MIP solutions. We conducted our experiments on a computational grid with 20 machines. Each machine has two Intel E5-2680 v2 2.80GHz processors each of which has 10 physical and 20 logical cores.
Results
In the experiments in this section, we are interested in identifying which kernel to use in the ML algorithm such that the full mechanism will yield the most e cient outcome. In selecting a kernel, we need to optimize the various parameters of the learning algorithm (i.e. ε, C, and any kernel hyperparameters). We tune these parameters to maximize the e eciency of the predicted allocation. Because we need the machine learning algorithm to operate within a reasonable comptuational budget, one of the most important parameters is the insensitivity threshold ε. This is because, as is standard in kernel-based ML methods, ε controls the number of support vectors that are likely to be part of the learned model. The size of the winner determination MIP that we solve (see Appendix A) is heavily dependent on the number of support vectors. So ε determines a tradeo between the learning error of the ML model, and the runtime of the winner determination optimizer. To investigate this tradeo , we conducted an experiment on the two expensive kernels, Gaussian and Exponential, which we present in Figure 2 , results for the other two domains are provided in Appendix B. To conduct this experiment, we rst generate an LSVM domain using SATS. From this domain we then sample Q ∈ {100, 200, 500} truthful bundle-value reports from each bidder. Based on these reports, we train an ML algorithm (with particular parameters) to constructṽ. We then evaluate thisṽ and its e ectiveness in inferring optimal allocations (in terms of quality and speed) according to four measures of interest which we next describe.
First, we provide the e ciency of the inferred optimal allocation. To do this, we compute the social welfare of the gold standard optimal allocation at true values, V (a * v ), using the concise MIP formulation built into SATS, and compare this to the true value of the inferred optimal allocation, V (a * v ). The table includes subcolumns for each Q, enabling us to compare the e ect of training data size on the learning algorithm. For each kernel we show the results for three insensitivity thresholds, ε: the one that is best for e ciency, one Figure 2 : The e ect of varying the insensitivity parameter ε on the predictive performance: both e ciency of the predicted optimal allocation, and learning error. Results are shown for the two expensive kernels, Experimental and Gaussian, in the LSVM domain. 12 twice that size, and zero. From the table, we can see that most of the e ciency gains occur in the rst half of the considered range of ε. Further, we see that for su ciently large ε, e ciency is monotonically increasing in the sample size Q. Next, we report the learning error of the machine learning algorithm. Here we are measuring learning error in the standard way by measuring the average absolute di erence between the predicted and true value for all bundles in the domain. 13 From the table we see that the higher the epsilon (and thus the fewer support vectors) the worse the learning error.
Next, we report the solve time for the winner determination MIP that nds a * v based upon the trained ML model. From the table we see that the solver always times out unless the insensitivity threshold ε is su ciently large.
Finally, we list the optimality gap reported by the solver when it stops. Speci cally, this is calculated as (o − o)/o, where o, and o are the solver's proven upper and lower bounds on the optimal value respectively. When the value is zero, the solver has proven optimality. As expected the optimality gap is closely correlated with the solve time, but it provides a quantitative measure of the consequence of the solver stopping early.
Overall from the table, we see that it is important to select epsilon carefully in order to properly tradeo learning performance (as measured via learning error) with solve time (as measured via WD Solve Time) in order to maximize the e ciency of the inferred optimal allocation (as measured by E ciency). Now that we have selected the best parameters for each kernel, we turn to a comparison of each of the kernels we have introduced for use with PVML. Accordingly, in each of our domains of study we have run PVML with Linear, Quadratic, Exponential and Gaussian kernels. We present the results for the LSVM domain in Figure 3 ; results for the other two domains are available in Appendix B. Following the result in the previous table, all perameters (i.e. ε, C, and any kernel hyperparameters) in this kernel comparison are tuned to maximize e ciency. We ran a similar experiment as in the previous table, by training with Q bundle-value pairs sampled uniformly at random from the domain, and then computing the same four outcome measures of interest.
From the table we can see the the Quadratic kernel yields the best e ciency at all sample sizes. The Linear kernel has the lowest e ciency, showing that more expensive kernels can be worth the computational e ort they require.
Turning to the learning error column, we observe that all of entries in this table are higher than the lowest observed value in kernel is best able to generalize in this domain, but its calculation is su ciently expensive that we are generally better o choosing a Quadratic kernel that has somewhat higher learning error, but a more succient winner determination formulation. We note that e ciency is typically inversely related to learning error. For example, the e ciency of the Quadratic kernel rises in the sample size Q, while its learning error decreases in Q. We note that this isn't always the case, for example in the Linear kernel, where increasing sample size yields lower learning error, but where the imputed optimal allocation actually becomes less e cient.
Turning to the nal columns in the table, we see that the Linear kernel is solvable very rapdly with 0 optimality gap. Whereas the Exponential and Gaussian kernels are more expensive.
Overall, the Quadratic kernel has the best tradeo between learning error and solve time, yielding the most e cient imputed optimality allocation within our computational budget, and we therefore adopt it going forward in the experients in the next section.
Experiments II: Comparing PVML against CCA
In this section, we turn to evaluating the full PVML mechanism in comparison to the widely used CCA.
Setup
To run our experiments we need to specify a number of attributes of both the PVML and CCA mechanisms, as well as de ne the scope and properties of the experiements themselves.
PVML. PVML is parametrized by the machine learning algorithm A, the number of queries Q max and the number of initial queries Q 0 . As we described in Section 6, our ML algorithm will be an SVR with Quadratic kernel for all domains of study. In our experiments we will consider values for Q max ∈ {100, 200, 500}. 14 We note that the Q max = 500 is a practical number of queries, given that it was used in the real-world Canadian auction that inspired the MRVM model that we use. We include the smaller values for comparison. For the number of initial queries Q 0 , we select an optimal value through o ine tuning. Speci cally, we use Q 0 = 90 for GSVM, Q 0 = 60 for LSVM, and Q 0 = 50 for MRVM.
CCA. The CCA is parametrized by the reserve prices employed, the way prices are updated, and what heuristics are assumed for bidder behavior in the supplementary phase. In our experiments, we use reserve prices for each license equal to 1% of the average license value derived from 10, 000 bundle-value pairs sampled from bidders in the domain. For price updates in our CCA, we follow the parametrization of the realworld Canadian CCA, that used 5% price increments. We note that the number of auction rounds we obtain under these price settings is similar to the number of auction rounds observed in the real-world Canadian auction. Finally, we specify how bidders in the CCA select which bundle-value pairs to report in the supplementary round. 15 We consider three di erent bundle selection heuristics:
• ClockBids: Include in the supplemental round only those bundles reported in the clock phase (as an answer to the corresponding demand query), at a value equal to the highest quoted price for that bundle.
• ClockBidsRaised: bidders provide their true values for the unique bundles reported during the clock phase.
• Pro tMax: bidders report their true values for the Q P M bundles earning them the highest pro t at the nal clock prices. To get a similar number of reported values across small and large bidders, we also let bidders report values for bundles earning them negative pro t. In our simulations we use Q P M = {100, 200, 500}.
Experimental Framework. Throughout this section, we simulate straightforward, truthful bidding both in PVML and the CCA. To be conservative, we don't allow any bidders to "push" bundles in our PVML evaluation. This avoids confusing the results by including contributions due to a bidder push heuristic. Our experiments are run on the same computational grid as was used in Section 6. The experiments in this section required a very signi cant computational e ort, with 162, 000 core hours employed.
Results
We now consider each of our three domains in turn. We start with the LSVM domain, for which we present results in Table 4 . To run the experiment we sample 100 instances drawn randomly from the domain. We then compute the outcome for these instances in each mechanism, and report the mean value on each row. We note that this results in a paired sampling process which improves the statistical sign cance of comparisons between the data points. 15 There is no prior work to guide the optimal strategy for bidders in choosing bundles to bid upon in the supplemental round. We therefore explored several di erent heuristics in our experiments after consulting with industry experts who have been involved in the design of the CCA and who have provided advice to bidders in the CCA. The lack of theoretical guidance here represents an additional strategic burden on bidders, in contrast to PVM.
Mechanism
From the table, we can see the CCA obtains almost perfect e ciency, but that with su ciently many samples, PVML is nearly as good. We note that the strong performance of the CCA is heavily dependent on the employed Pro t Max heuristic for the supplementary phase. In the table, we next report the fraction of surplus acruing to the seller. For the CCA, in this column we use a VCG-style payment rule on the reported bundle-value pairs from the supplementary phase, which produces a payment pro le most similar to VCG itself ( rst row), and the payments obtained in PVML (bottom rows). In LSVM, VCG produces a high level of revenue, and we see that the other mechanisms approximately match it (apart from the ClockBids heuristic of the CCA). In the next column we show a similar revenue number for the VCG-nearest core-selecting rule as applied to the bundle-value pairs in the supplemental round of the CCA (this is the payment rule that is often used in practice). As expected, we see some revenue lift when swapping VCG for the core-selecting rule. Finally the table shows the number of rounds employed by each mechanism. We see that PVML uses fewer rounds than the CCA, illustrating that it is a practical mechanism.
Overall, in the LSVM domain we observe that the CCA does well. This is likely due to bidders in the LSVM domain having strongly peaked preferences around a particular subset of bundles, which bidders can describe even when only stating 100 bundle-value pairs, as they can even in our setting with the smallest query cap.
Next we turn to the GSVM domain, the results for which we show in In the table, we can see that PVML provides 100% e ciency even with only a 100 query cap. The CCA with the Pro t Max heuristic is also performing well. Turning to revenue, we once again see that VCG produces a high level of revenue in this setting, and that all of the CCA and PVML versions are close to VCG, except for the ClockBids heuristic (as we saw in LSVM). Again, and as expected, we observe that the core-selecting payment rule produces a revenue lift. Finally, we observe that PVML requires a similar number of rounds as the CCA, although slightly more with a 500 query cap.
Importantly, we note that bidder preferences in the GSVM domain can be captured by the Quadratic kernel (see Appendix C). Whenever preferences can be fully captured in this way, with a high enough query cap, PVML e ciency will reach 100%; GSVM is simple enough that this is already reached with only 100 queries.
Finally, we turn to the larger, more realistic, and more complex MRVM domain, the results for which we show in Figure 6 .
MRVM has 2 98 bundles, and, importantly, these bundles are not strongly peaked. This means 500 bundle-value pairs is not su cient to reasonably describe bidder preferences. As a consequence the CCA Pro t Max heuristic is not nearly as e ective as it was in the simper domains. Moreover, Pro t Max is not the best heuristic for the CCA, as it previously was. We note that this means that a bidder cannot adopt a best heuristic apriori, but must instead taylor her strategy to the domain they are operating in (unlike in PVML). Even still, PVML is beating the best CCA heuristic on e ency by 1.3%. Turning to revenue, we observe that the CCA with the Pro t Max heuristic obtains only a very small revenue. Further, we observe that this low level of revenue is present not only with the VCG payment rule, but also with a core-selecting payment rule. By contrast, VCG yields a reasonable amount of revenue in this setting, a level matched by PVML. Finally, we observe that even in this very complex domain, PVML only requires a very modest number of rounds, signi cantly fewer than the number required by the CCA.
Overall we see that the PVML mechanism performs exceptionally well in this complex domain. We see that when the domain is very large and complex, the rich ML-based elicitation can be highly e ective, while linear pricing, as used by the CCA, becomes less e ective.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a machine learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction mechanism. In contrast to prior designs like the combinatorial clock auction (CCA), our auction does not use prices but value queries to interact with the bidders. Via simulations, we have shown that our ML-powered auction is able to achieve higher e ciency than the CCA, even with just a small number of queries per bidder.
Two components in our design are responsible for this e ciency gain: (1) the ML algorithm infers a bidder's value function on the whole bundle space, and (2) in each iteration of the auction, we compute the (tentatively) optimal allocation based on the inferred values, which we use to decide which value query to ask next to each bidder. To achieve good incentives, we have drawn on principles from the VCG mechanism to design PVM, which aligns bidders' incentives with allocative e ciency and is also very robust against strategic manipulations in practice.
Our results give rise to promising directions for future research: First, while we have shown how our elicitation method can be modi ed to allow bidders to only report bounds on their values, we have left a full mechanism based on this bounds-based elicitation method to future work. Second, while our method of selecting the initial set of queries uniformly at random from the whole bundle space has worked surprisingly well, future work could explore more sophisticated active learning methods for generating this initial set.
The design of a full auction mechanism based on upper-and-lower bounds queries is one of the future research directions based on this paper. allocation problem for dot-product kernels can be encoded via the following IP:
Problem (16) s.t.τ
Encoding (20) j∈x ik
Problem (16) By replacing the constraints in (21) with the constraints in (22), we obtain the following formulation of the allocation problem under RBF kernels:
Note that the size of both the integer programming problems presented above heavily depends on the number of support vectors. In both problems, each support vector x ik introduces two constraints and |x ik | + 1 binary variables under dot-product kernels or m + 1 binary variables under RBF kernels. As discussed in Section 5, one can reduce the number of support vectors by using a larger ε in the SVR training problem (16), which can be extremely helpful to maintain our mechanism computationally tractable. Figure 7 : The e ect of varying the insensitivity parameter ε on the predictive performance: both e ciency of the predicted optimal allocation, and learning error. Results are shown for the two expensive kernels, Experimental and Gaussian, in the GSVM domain. Figure 9 : The e ect of varying the insensitivity parameter ε on the predictive performance: both e ciency of the predicted optimal allocation, and learning error. Results are shown for the two expensive kernels, Experimental and Gaussian, in the MRVM domain. Proof. To prove this statement, it is su cient to show that each valuation v i of the Global Synergy Value Model (GSVM) domain is a 2-wise dependent valuation function in the sense of Conitzer, Sandholm and Santi (2005) and use Proposition 1 of Brero, Lubin and Seuken (2017) . According to Conitzer, Sandholm and Santi (2005) , a 2-wise dependent valuation is any valuation v i that can be expressed as
where w j and w j,j are scalar parameters. At the same time, as discussed by Goeree and Holt (2010) , any valuation of the GSVM domain v . Indeed, with these parameters, the value contributed to v i (x) in Equation (23) by each item j contained in bundle x will be the sum of (via all the w j,j such that j ∈ x and j = j ), which corresponds to Equation (24).
